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BASIR AHMED (Pursuing Research in West Asian and AfricanStudies, School of international Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi110067) Abstract Nuclear transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) areconditioned on IAEA safeguards on all current and future peaceful nuclearactivities, what are called the full-scope safeguards (FSS), or comprehensivesafeguards. Since India is a NNWS according to the NPT definition, the NSGGuidelines as currently implemented would, therefore, invoke FSS if India seeksnuclear technology or nuclear power plants. The condition for any progress onthe deal is the separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities thatIndia has committed to and the sequencing of the reciprocal steps envisaged inthe agreement. For the Indian department of atomic energy, however,meeting these seems to be a difficult proposition. In fact, the issue ofIndo-US Nuclear Agreement and IAEASafeguards is somewhat becoming controversial, arising chiefly from themanner in which the above part of the deal is being interpreted by the twoparties. This paper attempts to probe the position of both parties and itsgeopolitical and strategic implications forIndia. The recently concluded Indo-US nuclear agreementraises more questions than it answers. It is now a well accepted fact that, theUS offer of civilian nuclear cooperation carries hidden political, economic andstrategic costs. The Indo- US agreement will lead to a cap or a constraint onIndias nuclear weapons arsenal. According to the House of Representatives Billon nuclear cooperation, US should seek to achieve a moratorium on fissilematerial production by India, Pakistan, and China and promote the reduction andeventual elimination of Nuclear weapons in South Asia. The President shallreport annually to the Congress about US efforts to get India and Pakistan tosecure, cap and reduce their fissile material stockpiles. There may not beanything in any agreement that India has signed, which calls it to reduce orcap weapon grade fissile material stockpiles. However, USA may cite itsdomestic legal obligations as a reason to pressure India. And under suchcircumstances it would be quiet difficult for New Delhi to resist. Afteralready having marched a certain distance, it would be quiet hard for India torefuse concurrence to US demands. India holds that, the July 18, 2005, agreementis about Energy and not Arms or arms control. The Americans too hold that theagreement is about Indias energy need and it did not intend to put a cap onIndias military program. But the fact speaks otherwise. From the very beginninga non proliferation undertone is reflected in US approach. The attitude of UShas been to cash on the assurances of perpetual nuclear fuel supply to Indiainto a no nuclear testing condition. In other words, India agreed not toconduct nuclear tests, in return of fuel supply. India unilaterally accepted,as evident on the July 18, 2005 joint statement, to put a moratorium on nuclearweapon testing, without ensuring a reciprocal commitment from UnitedStates. The Senate bill authorizing nuclear commerce withIndia, declares that the special considerations granted to India shall cease tobe effective if India detonates a nuclear explosive device after the act comesinto force. The Nuclear Suppliers Groups rule will also become null and void ifIndia conducts an explosive nuclear test. However there are good reasons forIndia not to do so, due to the availability of recent technologies at NewDelhis disposable like computer simulation, it is not necessary for India toconduct a nuclear test on the ground. New Delhi can still test Nuclear Weaponthrough computer simulation method. But what is important is not whether NewDelhi can test Nuclear weapon on ground, or whether it is barred fromconducting test? The important thing is that, these decisions are put down by astate that itself refuses to be bound by any legal no test concordat. It isabout the moral justification, the binding nature and relevance of the clause.Whether a state which is itself not bound by a certain provisions, have a rightto dictate those provisions on other states? Any unilateral test by Indiatherefore, may not violate the agreement. And even if it does, there is nolegal obligation on India not to conduct an explosive test. If India goes forthe sub critical tests and the computer simulations, that US conducts in orderto test its own weapons, does not entail any penalty. In a situation where the government of the day isfelt to abandon the hold, and conducts on ground nuclear test. The USA andNational Suppliers Group would end its nuclear cooperation with India. And ifIndia withdraws it civilian facilities from IAEA safeguards, and if the clockin effect is turned to pre July 2005 status quo. It is India which is going toloose more. First, after already opening the civilian nuclear facilities forIAEA inspections and safeguards it would be difficult for India to withdraw.And even if it decides to withdraw, the purpose of withdrawal does not hold anymeaning because the Indian nuclear secrets and sites will be quiet well knownby USA and IAEA till then. And there is a possibility that our neighbours likePakistan may benefit from the whole episode. To say that, India would return topre July 2005, Status quo is easier said than done. It would be not possiblefor New Delhi to again unify the already separated the civilian and militarynuclear program. So far Indias experience in US assurances isconcerned, it is discouraging. India had agreed to in perpetuity safeguards forits indigenous civilian nuclear facilities in exchange for US assurances ofperpetual fuel supply for all reactors under IAEA conditionality. It isdifficult to trust in the assurances. Such assurances shall immediatelydissipate if the relations between India and US strains up, or if New Delhiconducts a nuclear test. The greater the dependence on imported safeguardedreactors, the greater would be the cost associated with suspension of nuclearcooperation. Another manner in which the nuclear cooperation withUSA entails heavy cost on Indias nuclear programme is, that the Indian nuclearweapons programme till now has been embedded in the civilian nuclear programme.This gave New Delhi the leverage and flexibility to accumulate fissilematerial. While New Delhi can still test nuclear bomb and build them. There isfull danger that India would have to pay a heavy price in case it decides todepart from its voluntary moratorium and conducts another nucleartest. Starting with the US Transformational Diplomacy, oneamong the many objectives it outlines is Partnerships not Paternalism andtransformation of old diplomatic institutions. US is now engaged in adjustingits domestic laws to enable civilian nuclear cooperation with India. However,its intends to extend Indias obligations beyond July 18 joint statement and theMarch 2 separation plan. The hidden motives may not be overruledaltogether. There are unpalatable and obscure references in therecently passed American legislation. There is a chance of their beingmisinterpreted and used against India, when the relations are not so good. NewDelhi should scrutinize and assess the legislation carefully, especially thebinding provisions that finds their way into the 123 agreement (bilateralaccord with the US) and the safeguards arrangement with the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency. There is also a chance that, New Delhis plan toseparate its civilian and military nuclear facilities would erode the dynamismof the countrys strategic deterrent. There may be budgetary difficulties,R&D problems and the danger of IAEA interference. Very recently, Russia and United States havecommitted themselves to expanding Nuclear energy cooperation with India andprovide nuclear fuel on a commercial basis. They are also expected tofacilitate the lifting of international curbs on nuclear technology transfer toNew Delhi. In a joint statement on nuclear cooperation, released by RussianPresident Vladimir Putin and US president George W. Bush said that, we lookforward to reinforcing our partnership with India. Furthermore he stated that,Washington and Moscow look toward Indias closer alignment with the nonproliferation regime. He said that, attempts are being made to work with Indiaon nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements and further enhancingthe global non proliferation regime. One thing which needs to be consideredseriously is nuclear cooperation with the USA- but at what cost? If it comes atthe cost of independent foreign and nuclear policy, it is better not toencourage the deal. One advantage to India from the nuclear agreementwith USA is that, the explicit recognition of Indias nuclear status by thebiggest nuclear power like USA may speed up the waiver of restrictions of theNuclear Supplier Group on nuclear cooperation with the New Delhi. India also tried to identify effectivemeasures to prevent transfer of sensitive nuclear equipment, materials, andtechnology to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allowthem to fall into the terrorists hands. The agreement set, effective measuresto control and foster a deeper probe into the leakage of nuclear technologiesfrom Pakistan. The July 18 statement reflects New Delhisdetermination to put behind it an era of defensive diplomacy. According toIndias Foreign Secretary, if India is to become a credible candidate forpermanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, New Delhi mustadjust its traditional positions. Owing to the changing context of internationalpolitics better relations with United States may be in Indias nationalinterest. United States is New Delhis largest trade partner, investor and animportant technology source. Besides, USA is a preeminent power that guides toa greater extent, the future course of international politics. There are strongsecurity convergences between India and the United States, a stronger bilateralrelation with United States might help New Delhi to get a strategic edge. Anadjustment of Indias foreign policy in the changing international order mayhelp New Delhi to better accommodate its aspirations. New Delhi must proceedahead while remaining critical about the deal. The text of U.S statement of Administration Policyon the nuclear cooperation Bill, H.R.5682 (United States and India NuclearCooperation Promotion Act of 2006) states that the legislation will facilitatenuclear energy cooperation between the worlds two largest democracies. It is apart of profound transformation in the way United States and India arepartnering to promote energy security, prosperity, democracy, stability, andpeace in the region and around the world. An important feature of thislegislation is the procedure for a joint resolution of approval that ensures anup or down vote without amendment on a proposed nuclear energy cooperationagreement with India. Section 4 (d), which restricts nuclear transfers toIndia, codifies guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for futuresupply to India, resulting that US would be the only NSG country legally boundby these requirements. According to the text (H.R 5682), such a provision willnot advance U.S non- proliferation objectives and could prove counterproductive, in effect limiting the ability of the United States to negotiatewith other NSG members and weakening the voluntary, cooperative nature of theNSG regime. It is difficult to imagine how the deal proves antagonistic to thenon- proliferation measures if it requires India to cap its production offissile material. Furthermore, it states that Section 3, whichpurports to dictate the foreign policy of the United States with respect tocritical national security issues, infringes upon the Presidents constitutionalauthority to conduct the nations foreign affairs. Section 4 (c), and (o), thatrequires the president to disclose the current status of, and future strategyfor, diplomatic negotiations regarding non proliferation issues, also infringesupon the Presidents constitutional responsibility over the timing and contentsof disclosure of sensitive diplomatic information. But it should be understoodin this context that, U.S president was never free to conduct foreign policy sofar as critical national security issues are concerned. He is bound with theCongress, whose approval is necessary in any critical foreign policyinitiative. Section 4 (c), and (o), also does not infringe his constitutionalresponsibility, because President is constitutionally bound to discloseperiodically the status and future strategies before the congress. India has agreed to support international efforts tolimit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including tostates such as Iran. India as a responsible member of international communityhas supported the effort towards this by voting twice in the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Board of Governors meeting. to find Iran in noncompliance with IAEA safeguards and to report the issue to the UN SecurityCouncil. But this step of India was guided by the traditional roots of itsforeign policy. India voted against Iran in pursuance of its proclaimed foreignpolicy goal of nuclear disarmament in the region and around the world. It wasguided by its own national interest, and should not be seen through the prismof Indo- US civilian nuclear cooperation. All said and done, the deal poses a number ofquestions about nuclear energy, disarmament, `promotionof democracy,' energy security and strategic stability in Asia. When it comesto Global energy stability, Indias interest does not align with those of theUS. Above all it is the fear of quid pro quo, allowing access to U.S. nuclearmaterial and equipment would make New Delhi more likely to help furtherAmerican strategic goals in the region. It would buttress Indias potentialutility as a hedge against a rising China, encourage India to pursue economicand strategic policies aligned with U.S. interests, and shape its choices inregard to global energy stability. The choice before India today is that, itcould use its nuclear weapons status as a pry to push for a multipolar worldsystem, which has been its major foreign policy objective, or it could use itsstatus as an instrument to help perpetuate the current global order and tomaintain the status quo. |